Proven Mnemonics & Acronyms — fast to learn, hard to forget.
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Negligence
DBCA (D=Duty, B=Breach, C=Causation, A=Actual damages) — the four elements of negligence
Duty · Breach · Causation · Actual damages
Duty · Breach · Causation · Actual damages
Every negligence claim requires all four elements — miss one and the claim fails. DBCA: Defendant owed a Duty of care · Breached that duty · Causation (actual + proximate) · Actual damages resulted. No harm = no negligence claim, even if defendant was careless.
Duty
Reasonable person standard — defendant must act as a reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances.
Breach
Failure to meet the standard of care. Hand formula (B<PL): breach if burden of precaution is less than probability × magnitude of loss.
Causation
Two-part test: Actual cause (but-for test) AND proximate cause (foreseeable harm, no superseding cause).
Intentional torts require a deliberate act — not negligence. ABCDEFFT covers the major ones tested on every intro law exam. Unlike negligence, intent to cause the act (not necessarily the harm) is enough. Transferred intent applies across most of these.
Assault
Intentional act causing reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful contact. No physical contact required.
Battery
Intentional harmful or offensive contact with another person. Contact need not cause injury — an unwanted kiss is battery.
Conversion
Intentional interference with another's personal property so serious it warrants full value — essentially forced sale.
Strict Liability
AWD (A=Abnormally dangerous activities, W=Wild animals, D=Defective products) — three categories of strict liability
Strict liability holds defendants liable without any proof of negligence or intent. AWD covers the three main categories: abnormally dangerous activities (blasting, storing explosives) · wild animals · defective products (products liability). Engage in these — you pay if harm results.
Abnormally dangerous
Rylands v. Fletcher rule — activities with high risk of serious harm that can't be eliminated with care. Blasting, fumigation, nuclear material.
Wild animals
Owners of wild animals (lions, bears, exotic pets) are strictly liable for any harm caused. Domestic animals: one-bite rule in most states.
Defective products
Products liability — manufacturer/seller liable for defective design, manufacturing defect, or failure to warn. Restatement §402A.
Defamation
FPATH (F=False statement of fact, P=Publication, A=About plaintiff, T=Tangible harm, H=Higher standard for public figures/actual malice) — elements of defamation
False · Published · About plaintiff · To a third party · Harm to reputation
False · Published · About plaintiff · To a third party · Harm to reputation
FPATH covers defamation's core elements. Critical distinction: public figures (celebrities, politicians) must prove actual malice (NYT v. Sullivan) — knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard. Private figures only need negligence. Truth is an absolute defense.
False
Must be a false statement of fact — not opinion. "I think he's dishonest" is opinion; "He stole $1,000" is a factual claim.
Published
Communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff. Repeating a defamatory statement is also publication.
Actual malice
NYT v. Sullivan (1964) — public figures must prove defendant knew statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for truth.
Causation
BUT-FOR test (actual causation — but for defendant's breach, would plaintiff have been harmed?) + FORESEEABLE (proximate causation — was the harm a foreseeable result of the breach?)
Actual cause (but-for test) · Proximate cause (foreseeability)
Actual cause (but-for test) · Proximate cause (foreseeability)
Causation has two gates a plaintiff must pass through. Actual cause: but for the defendant's act, would the harm have occurred? Proximate cause: was the type of harm foreseeable? Superseding causes — unforeseeable intervening acts — can break the chain and relieve defendants of liability.
But-for test
But for defendant's act, plaintiff would not have been harmed. Fails if harm would have occurred anyway (concurrent causes use substantial factor test).
Proximate cause
Was the plaintiff's injury a foreseeable result of defendant's negligence? Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail Road — liability limited to foreseeable plaintiffs.
Superseding cause
An unforeseeable intervening act that breaks the causal chain — relieves original defendant of liability. Criminal acts of third parties often qualify.
Defenses to Negligence
CRAVE (C=Contributory negligence, R=comparative negligence Reduction, A=Assumption of risk, V=Volenti non fit injuria, E=Employer/vicarious liability defenses)
CRAVE covers defenses a negligent defendant can raise. Most states use comparative fault (pure or modified) — reducing plaintiff's award by their percentage of fault. Contributory negligence (old rule, still in 4 states) bars recovery entirely if plaintiff was even 1% at fault.
Contributory negligence
Old common law rule — plaintiff's own negligence, however slight, bars all recovery. Still used in MD, VA, NC, AL, DC.
Comparative fault
Pure: plaintiff recovers even if 99% at fault (reduced). Modified: plaintiff barred if 50% or 51%+ at fault (majority rule).
Assumption of risk
Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily encountered a known risk. Express (signed waiver) or implied (spectator at baseball game).
Products Liability
DMW (D=Design defect, M=Manufacturing defect, W=Warning defect) — three theories of products liability
Products liability holds manufacturers, distributors, and sellers strictly liable for defective products. DMW covers the three defect types: Design (the whole product line is dangerous) · Manufacturing (one unit deviated from the design) · Warning (adequate instructions or warnings were missing).
Design defect
The entire product line is unreasonably dangerous. Tests: consumer expectation (ordinary consumer) or risk-utility (was safer design feasible?).
Manufacturing defect
A specific unit deviated from the intended design during production — the blueprint was fine, the execution wasn't.
Failure to warn
Product had non-obvious risks that manufacturer failed to disclose. Learned intermediary doctrine: pharma companies warn doctors, not patients directly.
Unlike contract law, tort damages can include punitive awards. CESP: Compensatory (make plaintiff whole) · Economic/Special damages (medical bills, lost wages — calculable) · Non-economic/General damages (pain and suffering, emotional distress) · Punitive damages (egregious/malicious conduct only).
Special damages
Quantifiable economic losses — medical expenses, lost wages, future earnings, property damage. Must be specifically pleaded.
General damages
Non-economic losses — pain and suffering, loss of consortium, emotional distress, disfigurement. No precise calculation.
Punitive damages
Awarded to punish and deter — only when defendant's conduct was malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive. Due process limits ratio vs. compensatory.
Defenses to Int. Torts
SCND (S=Self-defense, C=Consent, N=Necessity, D=Discipline) — defenses to intentional torts
Self-defense · Consent · Necessity · Defense of others/property
Self-defense · Consent · Necessity · Defense of others/property
Intentional tort defendants have powerful defenses. SCND: Self-defense (reasonable force to protect yourself) · Consent (plaintiff agreed) · Necessity (public or private — destroy property to prevent greater harm) · Defense of others and defense of property. Force must always be proportionate.
Self-defense
May use reasonable force to prevent imminent harmful contact. Deadly force only if reasonable belief of deadly threat. No duty to retreat in most states.
Consent
Express or implied consent negates most intentional torts. Participants in contact sports impliedly consent to ordinary contact. Consent obtained by fraud is invalid.
Necessity
Public necessity (destroy property to save many) — complete defense, no liability. Private necessity (save yourself) — partial defense, must pay for damage caused.
🎓 Common Exam Questions
Q: What does DBCA stand for and explain the four elements of negligence?
A: DBCA (Duty, Breach, Causation, Actual damages): all four must be proven by a preponderance of evidence. Duty: the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty of reasonable care. The duty question is a legal one: Was the plaintiff a foreseeable victim? (Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. — Cardozo majority: duty owed to foreseeable plaintiffs in the zone of danger; Andrews dissent: duty owed to the world). Special duties: landowners (invitees = highest duty of reasonable care; licensees = warn of known hidden dangers; trespassers = no duty, except discovered or child trespassers under attractive nuisance doctrine). Breach: failed to act as a reasonable prudent person would under the circumstances — an objective standard. Custom is evidence of reasonableness but not conclusive. B < PL formula (Hand formula): negligence exists when the burden of avoiding the risk (B) is less than the probability of harm (P) times the magnitude of the loss (L). Causation: actual cause (but-for test or substantial factor test for concurrent causes) AND proximate/legal cause (was the harm within the foreseeable risk that made the defendant's conduct negligent?). Actual damages: physical injury, property damage, emotional distress, economic loss.
Q: What does ABCDEFFT stand for in intentional torts and explain each?
A: ABCDEFFT (Assault, Battery, Conversion, Defamation, IIED, False imprisonment, Fraud/misrepresentation, Trespass): Assault: reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact — no physical contact required, but words alone are generally not enough (must be accompanied by threatening act). Battery: intentional harmful or offensive contact with another person — contact need not cause injury; extends to anything connected to plaintiff's person. Conversion: intentional exercise of dominion or control over another's chattel that so seriously interferes with the owner's right to control it that the defendant may justly be required to pay its full value. IIED (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress): extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress. Outrageous = goes beyond all bounds of decency. False imprisonment: intentional and complete confinement of plaintiff within fixed boundaries without consent and without privilege — must know of confinement or be harmed by it. Fraud: intentional misrepresentation of material fact known to be false, made to induce reliance, with justifiable reliance and damages. Trespass to land: intentional entry onto another's land without permission — no damage required (nominal damages available).
Q: What does AWD stand for in strict liability and explain when it applies?
A: AWD (Abnormally dangerous Activities, Wild animals, Defective products): Strict liability holds defendants liable without proof of negligence or intent — the activity or product itself imposes liability when harm results. Abnormally dangerous activities (Restatement Second §520): consider high degree of risk, risk that cannot be eliminated even with due care, not a matter of common usage in the community, inappropriateness of the activity to the location, and whether the value to the community is outweighed by dangerous attributes. Classic examples: blasting with explosives, storing large quantities of flammable gas, crop dusting in residential areas. Wild animals: owner is strictly liable for harm caused by wild animals — no knowledge of dangerous propensity needed. For domestic animals: liable only if knew of the specific dangerous propensity (one-bite rule). Defective products: manufacturers, distributors, and retailers in the chain of distribution are strictly liable for physical harm caused by a defective product (design defect, manufacturing defect, or warning defect — DMW). Plaintiff must show: (1) the product was defective, (2) the defect existed when it left defendant's control, (3) the defect caused plaintiff's harm.
Q: What are CESP damages in tort law and explain compensatory vs. punitive damages?
A: CESP (Compensatory, Economic, Special damages, Punitive): Compensatory damages: intended to put the plaintiff back in the position they would have been in but for the defendant's wrong. Two types: Economic (special) damages: calculable monetary losses — medical expenses, lost wages, future medical costs, loss of earning capacity, property damage. Must be proven with reasonable certainty. Non-economic (general) damages: non-monetary losses — pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, loss of enjoyment of life. These cannot be calculated precisely and are determined by the jury. Punitive damages: awarded in addition to compensatory damages to punish defendants for particularly egregious, malicious, or reckless conduct and to deter future similar conduct. NOT available in contract law. Constitutional limits: the Supreme Court has suggested punitive damages should generally not exceed 9 or 10 times compensatory damages (State Farm v. Campbell). Nominal damages: small symbolic award when rights were violated but no actual harm occurred (common in intentional torts like trespass and assault). Mitigation: plaintiffs have a duty to take reasonable steps to minimize their damages — failure to mitigate reduces recovery.
Q: What does FPATH stand for and explain defamation for public vs. private figures?
A: FPATH (False statement of fact, Publication, About plaintiff, Tangible harm, Higher standard for public figures): False statement of fact: must be a statement that can be proven true or false — opinions are protected (I think John is dishonest is opinion; John stole money is a fact). Pure opinion is an absolute defense. Publication: communicated to at least one third party (even whispered to one person). About plaintiff: must be of and concerning the plaintiff — a reasonable person would understand it refers to the plaintiff. Harm: defamation per se (statements in four categories: accuse of crime, loathsome disease, professional misconduct, sexual immorality) — harm is presumed, no proof needed. Defamation per quod: other statements require proof of special damages. Public figures and officials (NYT v. Sullivan, 1964): must prove actual malice — knowing the statement was false OR acting with reckless disregard for truth or falsity. This is a First Amendment requirement to protect robust public debate. Private figures: only need to show negligence as to truth or falsity (in most states). The distinction between public and private figure is crucial — politicians, celebrities, and prominent public figures face a much higher burden to win defamation suits.